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 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the world needs to reach 
net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 in order to limit warming to 1.5°C and avoid the most 
catastrophic impacts of climate change (Millar et al. 2017). For the electricity sector in the 
United States, that means replacing 63% of annual electricity generation, a staggering 2,580 
billion kWh, with non-emitting alternatives in the next three decades (EIA 2020b). A 
transformation of this magnitude will undoubtedly require drastic policy intervention. While 
federal climate policy in the U.S. remains stagnant, progressive states have begun to chart their 
own paths to a clean energy future. These states are beginning to confront the fundamental 
challenges of remaking the U.S. energy system, most importantly, who will reap the benefits and 
who will bear the costs. As more states and perhaps the federal government look to act on 
climate, lessons from early adopters will prove invaluable for designing clean energy policies 
that distribute the impacts of the energy transition equitably. 
           Without specific strategies for equity, the transition to clean energy threatens to 
disproportionately disadvantage America’s most vulnerable communities. Poor communities are 
particularly susceptible to energy price shocks and reliability issues. Nearly a third of all U.S. 
households and half of Latinx and Black households already struggle to pay energy bills (EIA 
2015). Many of these households forgo food and medicine to heat and light their homes. 
Additionally, fossil fuel production has formed an essential part of the American economy for 
over 100 years. Communities across the U.S., from Appalachia to the Navajo Nation, depend on 
the fossil fuel industry for their economic wellbeing. Transitioning to clean energy represents a 
serious risk to vulnerable communities but also a massive opportunity. Renewable electricity can 
offer energy security and independence for low-income households and revitalize neglected 
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fossil fuel-dependent communities with new investment. The U.S. needs to prioritize equity, not 
just urgency, in the transition to a clean energy economy to actualize these opportunities for 
social justice. 
           The state-level clean energy policy environment is rapidly evolving with vastly different 
approaches to equity. States have overwhelmingly turned to portfolio mandates, known as clean 
energy standards (CESs)1, to meet the challenge of transforming the electricity sector. CESs 
require retail electricity suppliers to supply a minimum percentage of their retail load with 
eligible sources of clean energy. While CESs have been in use since the 1980s, a new wave of 
100% CESs signal their emergence as the predominant policy mechanism for decarbonizing the 
electricity sector. Whereas the marginal targets of previous CESs encouraged early technology 
development, the net-zero commitment of 100% CESs requires a fundamental transformation of 
the electricity industry.  
 The impacts of these mandates, from higher consumer electricity bills, to displaced 
workers, to new economic opportunities in clean energy, will not be felt evenly across society. 
Recognizing this reality, early states have adopted strategies to mitigate the adverse impacts of 
these policies and redistribute their benefits. Already there exists significant divergence both in 
who these strategies are intended to protect and what policy mechanisms they utilize. These 
differences are due in part to the fact that the transition to clean energy will impact each state 
differently but also to differing social and political climates. States considering 100% CESs 
should learn from these early adopters while tailoring policies to their individual needs.  
 To that end, this paper compares states’ approaches to equity in 100% CESs. I 
 
1 This policy mechanism is also often referred to as a renewable portfolio standard. For the purpose of this paper 
these two terms are equivalent.  
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 avoid adopting an explicit definition of equity because I do not attempt to evaluate the impacts 
of these policies. Rather, I analyze how different states are forging their own definitions of 
equity within their clean energy policy. Specifically, I present case studies of four early adopters 
that have championed equity in their clean energy transition. First, New Mexico offers a unique 
strategy for protecting displaced fossil fuel workers through power plant securitization. Next, 
California’s robust policy context demonstrates how to minimize the financial impact of clean 
energy to ratepayers. Finally, New York and Washington each use dramatically different 
mechanisms to integrate reparational equity into the core of their clean energy policy. While it is 
still too early to quantitatively analyze the distributional impact of these policies, this case study 
approach provides useful insights into which constituencies states are prioritizing in the 
transition to clean energy and what strategies states are using to achieve equitable outcomes. 
Furthermore, these case studies reveal notable differences in states’ interpretations of equity in 
the context clean energy. I find that these differences reflect states’ needs to balance their 
cultural and political values with economic realities.  
This paper proceeds with an overview of the U.S. clean energy policy context and a 
review of relevant literature on the distributional impacts of CESs. The next section presents four 
case studies. The final section compares key components across case studies and discusses the 
role of CESs in the broader context of clean energy equity. 
 
II. U.S. Clean Energy Policy Context 
 
 Clean energy policy has traditionally prioritized efficacy and efficiency over equity due 
to the urgency of the threat posed by climate change. As renewable generation technology 
developed in the 90s, policymakers aimed to build out as much capacity as possible, paying 
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exorbitantly high costs relative to other sources of energy (Mormann 2019). Slowly, as the 
market matured, cost effectiveness rose as an important policy consideration, leading to the 
introduction of competitive auctions and other market-based policies. These policies have served 
to mitigate the cost to ratepayers burdened by the economic inefficiency of early renewable 
energy policy. Only recently has distributional equity risen as a principal concern of 
policymakers.  
           U.S. state-level CESs have followed the same trajectory. Since Iowa enacted the first CES 
in 1983, CESs have grown to incorporate market-based mechanisms, cost caps, and policy 
interventions for distributional equity. Over this period, CESs have expanded to cover 29 states, 
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, applying to 56% of the total U.S. electricity market 
(Barbose 2019). While the design of CESs varies from state to state, they all follow the same 
general structure. Producers receive tradable credits for each MWh of clean electricity 
generation. Retail electricity suppliers must either earn enough credits to cover the specified 
percentage of their retail load or purchase credits on the open market. This structure enables 
states to set specific targets for the share of clean energy in their electricity mix and producers to 
achieve them in a technology-neutral and cost-effective manner. Key differences across states 
include the amount of clean energy mandated and the timeline for its attainment, the eligible 
sources, and the penalties for non-compliance. From 2015 to 2020, eight states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico enacted 100% CESs with the timeline for decarbonization ranging 
from 2032 to 2050. This new wave solidified CESs role as the dominant state-level policy 
mechanism to guide the transition to clean energy.  
           States have utilized CESs despite disadvantages in cost effectiveness and economic 
efficiency relative to other policy mechanisms for mitigating climate change. The economics 
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literature has extensively highlighted the advantages of pricing carbon through a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade system compared to mandates such as CESs. In theory, pricing carbon is a more 
cost-effective way to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions because it leads to equalized 
marginal abatement costs across polluters. Whereas CESs indirectly reduce GHG emissions by 
promoting clean energy, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade put a price directly on GHG emissions. 
In this way, carbon pricing allows firms to leverage a wider variety of abatement mechanisms 
that may not qualify under a CES such as replacing coal with cleaner-burning natural gas. As 
long as they include a market for credits or allowances, both mechanisms are cost effective. The 
difference is that CESs build clean electricity generation at least cost while carbon pricing abates 
GHG emissions at least cost.  
 Similarly, carbon pricing is widely regarded as more economically efficient than CESs. 
Climate policies are economically efficient if and only if they result in the level of abatement 
where the marginal cost to abate one ton of carbon equals the marginal benefit of abating one 
ton. A free market does not achieve an efficient outcome because it does not capture the societal 
benefit of abating GHG emissions. Imposing a carbon tax equal to the social cost of carbon 
accurately values the benefit of abatement and leads to an efficient outcome. Alternatively, 
setting the cap on emissions in a cap-and-trade system to the efficient level of pollution 
accomplishes the same thing. Due to CESs’ focus on clean energy production rather than the 
externality of GHG emissions, they are less likely to reach the efficient level of GHG emissions. 
 Distributional equity has recently emerged as an additional essential metric for 
comparative policy analysis in clean energy. From an economic perspective, equity is the 
measure of how the net cost of a particular policy intervention is distributed across society. A 
policy is considered regressive if the net cost, as a proportion of income, is higher for those less 
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able to pay while progressive policies impose a lower ratio of cost to income on these 
individuals. Progressive policies encourage universal access, consistent with the idea of energy 
as a basic necessity (Mormann 2019). Thus, the distribution of net costs is a crucial metric for 
comparing clean energy policies. 
 A 2019 special issue of the Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource 
Economics explores the distributional equity of various clean energy policy mechanisms. In the 
introduction, Deryugina et al. (2019) attribute the preference for mandates such as CESs to the 
perceived adverse distributional impacts of carbon taxes. The rest of the issue presents empirical 
evidence suggesting that policymakers’ perceptions are unfounded and that in truth, carbon taxes 
are less regressive than their alternatives. The issue establishes on a broad level that technology 
mandates including those on energy efficiency, fuel economy, and clean electricity are more 
regressive policy tools than carbon taxes (Levinson 2019, Davis and Knittel 2019, Bruegge et al. 
2019, Fischer and Pizer 2019, Reguant 2019). While both mechanisms impose high proportional 
costs on low-income consumers, carbon taxes have the distinct advantage of generating revenue 
that can be redistributed to offset costs. Furthermore, carbon taxes are more cost effective, 
imposing lower total costs to consumers. Importantly, Reguant (2019) points out that the 
distributional impacts of clean electricity policies largely depend on how costs are passed on to 
ratepayers through electricity bills.  
 Despite these disadvantages, policymakers have favored CESs because they are more 
politically feasible. Relative to other regulations, CESs represent only a marginal expansion of 
regulatory authority. For decades, states have designed mechanisms to regulate sources of 
electricity to address reliability and other concerns. CESs can be seen as a response to public 
demand for reliable, inexpensive, and environmentally friendly electricity. Furthermore, 
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mandates simply do not carry the same negative political connotations as taxes. The costs of 
CESs are obscured to a higher degree than those associated with carbon taxes or cap-and-trade. 
Overall, clean energy standards offer a politically palatable alternative to pricing carbon. Given 
the urgency of climate change, political feasibility is arguably the most important consideration 
for climate policy. Goulder (2020) suggests that if the probability of near-term implementation is 
included in cost-benefit analysis, then CESs may even emerge as less costly overall than carbon 
pricing.  
 Importantly, CESs and carbon pricing are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Political 
limitations have forced policymakers to choose between these two mechanisms and pitted CESs 
against carbon pricing in the literature. In reality, carbon pricing and CESs can complement each 
other by simultaneously raising the cost of fossil fuel generation and mandating clean technology 
development. Currently, several progressive states including California and New York have both 
100% CESs and cap-and-trade in place. As other states start to take more aggressive action on 
climate, this tradeoff may erode. For example, in April 2020 Virginia enacted a 100% CES and 
joined the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the same bill. Ideally, down the line combined 
100% CESs and carbon pricing will be commonplace. However, many states lack the political 
will for such aggressive climate policy. For these states, CESs will likely continue to dominate 
clean energy policy. Given this reality, the distributional impacts of CESs are most relevant for 
clean energy equity in the United States. The next section explores these impacts and potential 
policy solutions.  
 
III. Distributional Impacts of Clean Energy Standards 
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The primary impacts of CESs can be grouped into three major categories: increased cost 
of electricity, workforce disruption, and environmental benefits. Each of these impacts is not 
distributed equally across society. The first two offer ample reason and opportunity for policy 
intervention to redistribute their net costs. Targeted cost softening strategies can mitigate the 
disproportionate burden of high electricity prices on low-income ratepayers. Secondly, 
workforce retraining and deliberate location of replacement resources can ensure that new 
economic opportunities in clean energy are available to displaced fossil fuel workers and their 
communities. On the other hand, CESs’ environmental benefits in the form of reduced local air 
pollution and the mitigation of climate change are difficult to redistribute and already primarily 
benefit disadvantaged communities. Policymakers have little ability or desire to intervene in the 
distribution of environmental benefits. For this reason, commitments to equity in CESs have 
primarily focused on redistributing the net costs of electricity rate increases and workforce 
disruption. 
CESs likely increase retail electricity rates through a number of distinct mechanisms. 
Primarily, CESs require utilities to purchase electricity from sources that may be more expensive 
than fossil fuel alternatives. While the cost of renewables has shown a steep decline, they still 
have not reached cost parity with natural gas across the board. Current estimates put the 
Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) of solar photovoltaics between $36/MWh and $46/MWh 
and the LCOE of onshore wind between $29/MWh and $56/MWh (Lazard 2019). The LCOE of 
natural gas combined cycle ranges from $41/MWh to $74/MWh (Lazard 2019). Proponents of 
CESs argue that the mandates will encourage investment in renewable energy technology and 
continue to drive down costs. With many policies stretching as far as 30 years into the future, it 
is more than likely that renewables will gain a clear cost advantage over the course of the 
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policy’s implementation. However, even if solar and wind have a clear cost advantage on an 
LCOE basis, they are not necessarily the cheaper option overall because they are not direct 
substitutes for dispatchable electricity. Unlike natural gas-fired power plants, solar and wind 
cannot be turned on whenever the grid needs electricity. The bottom line is that CESs restrict 
utilities’ ability to choose the lowest-cost option when contracting new generation. In many 
cases, CES-eligible technologies are the lowest-cost option. However, if they are not, the CES 
forces the utility to pay above market price, leading to higher prices for consumers. 
Empirical studies have found that CESs in the U.S. have led to higher electricity rates, 
but significant disagreement remains on the magnitude of this effect. A controversial study by 
the University of Chicago’s Energy Policy Institute found that in the 29 states with CESs, 
consumers paid $125.2 billion more for electricity than they would have without these policies in 
place (Greenstone and Nath 2019). Furthermore, they calculated that CESs led to an increase in 
average retail electricity prices of 11% over the first seven years of the policy. While the study 
acknowledges that CESs were successful in reducing GHG emissions, the estimated cost of 
abatement ranged from $130/tCO2e to as much as $460/tCO2e. This cost exceeds almost all 
calculations for the social cost of carbon (The Obama Administration’s best estimate was 
$50/tCO2e in 2019 dollars). On the other hand, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL) and the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) found that CESs have had a minimal impact on 
retail electricity prices. Their study estimated a retail price increase of less than 1% (Barbose 
2019). This difference can largely be attributed to differences in analytical methodology. 
Greenstone and Nath’s (2019) approach of analyzing differences in prices between states with 
and without CESs has come under criticism for oversimplifying a variety of distinct policies into 
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a single binary treatment effect (Jenkins 2019). On the other hand, this approach could reveal 
underlying forces that do not appear in case by case analysis.  
Greenstone and Nath (2019) point to three often overlooked mechanisms which may 
explain their higher cost estimates. First, increasing the share of renewable generation will likely 
lead to higher transmission costs. Utility-scale renewable generation takes up a lot of physical 
space and is generally located far from population centers. As a result, transitioning from fossil 
fuel infrastructure to renewable infrastructure will require significant changes to transmission 
infrastructure as well. While LBNL and NREL account for these costs in their estimate, they 
acknowledge that transmission costs are likely to increase significantly as the renewable 
electricity share moves above 50%. Second, the intermittent nature of renewable sources means 
that back-up capacity must be added. Energy storage is the primary means of managing 
intermittent load, but battery technology remains relatively expensive and other forms, such as 
pumped hydro, have not been proven on a large scale. With current low levels of renewable 
capacity, load management is less of an issue because fossil fuel generation can supplement 
periods of low renewable generation. However, as CESs move upwards of 50%, new methods of 
load management will be necessary. This additional infrastructure is likely to drive up operating 
costs for utilities. Third, aggressive mandates threaten to prematurely displace existing 
generation. Depending on the structure of regulation, the cost of these stranded assets may also 
be passed on to consumers.  
While the magnitude of the increase is still up for debate, the general consensus that 
CESs will raise electricity rates presents a significant equity issue. In the absence of cost 
softening strategies, higher electricity rates disproportionately burden low-income ratepayers. 
According to a 2016 study by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE), 
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low-income households, defined as less than 80% of Area Median Income, spend an average of 
7.3% of their income on energy compared to 2.3% for non-low-income households (Drehobl and 
Ross 2016). Therefore, policies that increase electricity prices impose a higher cost as a 
proportion of income on households with less ability to pay. Dynamic rate structures can 
alleviate this effect. Under a flat rate structure, all income groups pay the same amount per unit 
of electricity. For low-income households, this cost accounts for a higher proportion of income 
relative to high-income households. Under an increasing block tariff, high electricity users pay 
more per unit of electricity. Wealthier households tend to use more electricity and therefore pay 
proportionally more under this rate structure. As a result, when an increasing block tariff is in 
place, wealthier households shoulder a higher portion of the burden imposed by retail rate 
increases. Farrell and Lyons (2017) find empirical support for this theory in a study of Ireland’s 
Public Service Obligation levies associated with renewable energy subsidies.  
Indirect cost softening strategies can also lead to more equitable CES implementation. 
Energy efficiency and distributed generation reduce energy demand and thus soften the impact of 
increased retail rates. These measures are often associated with CESs due to the shared goal of 
reducing GHG emissions. However, high upfront costs can preclude low-income consumers 
from access to these cost softening measures. Therefore, they only lead to equitable outcomes 
when they are made available to low-income households through explicit policy interventions. If 
uniformly applied, subsidies for energy efficiency and distributed generation can have the 
opposite effect by reducing the burden of high-income households who are more likely to be able 
to afford high upfront costs. 
CESs disruption of the energy workforce is a second crucial distributional impact that 
policymakers are attempting to address. CESs require a dramatic transition from a fossil fuel 
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workforce to a clean energy workforce. There is an abundance of literature analyzing the 
potential for this transition to create jobs. These studies have overwhelmingly found that clean 
energy electricity generation creates both more jobs per unit of energy and more jobs per dollar 
spent than fossil fuel generation. The World Bank estimates that wind and solar in the U.S. 
create 13.5 jobs per million dollars of spending compared to 5.2 for oil and gas (Cited in Kats 
2016). This estimate includes direct jobs (e.g. onsite construction worker), indirect jobs (e.g. 
upstream steel manufacturer), and induced jobs (e.g. grocery store clerk that relies on the 
spending of direct and indirect workers), covering every domestic aspect of the supply chain. 
This can largely be attributed to the relative labor and capital inputs of these technologies. Fuel 
comprises a significant portion of the cost of fossil fuel energy whereas renewable energy is 
more labor intensive. Blyth et al. (2014) found the average labor intensity of renewable energy to 
be more than four times greater than that of fossil fuels (0.65 jobs/GWh compared to 0.14 
jobs/GWh). Due to their labor intensity, even as renewables become relatively cheaper per unit 
of energy, they will maintain their advantage over fossil fuels in terms of jobs per dollar spent.  
While there is a broad consensus on the job creation potential of clean energy, assessing 
the employment effects of CESs requires more detailed analysis. Wei et al. (2009) draw on 15 
existing studies to construct a model of CESs’ net employment effects. Where many studies 
estimate gross renewable job creation, Wei et al. estimate net job creation above and beyond that 
projected by existing policies, taking into account job displacement in the fossil fuel industry. 
This results in far stronger conclusions compared to traditional analysis on the overall impact of 
CESs. Using this methodology, Wei et al. estimate a cumulative gain of 2.5 million job-years 
above business as usual from 2009 to 2030 for a 30% national CES. More recently, the Institute 
of Labor Economics (IZA) and Centre for European Economic Research (2019) found empirical 
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evidence supporting Wei et al.’s prediction of net job gain. However, comparing across policies, 
IZA’s evidence suggests that the magnitude of this gain depends on the effects of CESs on 
electricity rates. Blyth et al. (2014) also voice concern that short-term green job creation could be 
offset across the economy by long-term decreases in disposable income. Thus, the job creation 
benefits of CESs depend not only on their direct workforce impact but also on their financial 
costs. While this concern has not been analyzed in depth, it highlights the interconnection 
between the financial impact on consumers and the overall employment impact.  
Overall the workforce disruption caused by CESs represents a net societal benefit with 
significant equity implications. The key concern is how the benefit of new green jobs and the 
displacement of traditional fossil fuel jobs will be distributed across society. There is no reason 
to believe that fossil fuel workers will naturally transition to clean energy jobs. Instead, it is 
likely that the switch to clean energy will cause a transformation in the location and necessary 
skills of energy jobs. First, renewable energy depends on natural factors that are spatially 
dispersed. Whereas fossil fuel plants can be located far away from their fuel sources, renewable 
generation can only be located where renewable resources are naturally available. As a result, 
fossil fuel plants tend to be located close to population centers for ease of transmission. On the 
other hand, renewable generation is typically built away from population centers where there is 
sufficient space and access to renewable resources. Navigating the relocation of energy jobs is 
necessary to ensure a just transition to clean energy. 
Second, the transition from fossil fuel jobs to clean energy jobs will require significant 
changes in occupational skill needs. Meeting targets set by CESs will require both a quantitative 
and qualitative change in occupational skill training. Increased demand for specific occupations 
does not necessarily change the skill needs of that occupation. For example, CESs are likely to 
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increase demand for electricians and construction workers who build transmission infrastructure. 
The necessary skill set for this work does not change based on the energy source, thus 
representing a purely quantitative change. This type of change can be thought of as restructuring, 
or structural shifts in employment between and within industries (Strietska-Ilina 2011). On the 
other side, the clean energy transition will create many entirely new occupations with novel skill 
sets such as solar panel and wind turbine technicians. This change is most likely to produce 
skilled, high-paying jobs (Muro et al. 2019). Proponents of clean energy often turn to these high-
paying jobs as signs of the economic benefits of solar and wind (Sen 2017).  
While there is evidence that clean energy jobs are on average higher paying and more 
skilled than fossil fuel jobs (Muro et al. 2019), it is important to consider the full effect of clean 
energy policy on the labor market not just that of new occupations. A significant but less 
commonly studied impact lies in the greening of existing jobs, changing the skill profiles within 
occupations. This could affect a variety of less-skilled jobs related to clean energy construction 
and maintenance from cement and steelworkers to onsite electricians. Across green restructuring, 
new occupations, and the greening of existing jobs, CESs represent a drastic transition in the 
occupational skill set of energy jobs. Overall, this transition will likely be towards higher-skilled 
jobs, leaving unskilled fossil fuel workers especially vulnerable to displacement.  
Strategies for a just transition often focus on policy interventions to protect unskilled 
fossil fuel workers. These can take the form of retraining, to address changes in skill needs, or 
relocation assistance, to address the changing geography of energy infrastructure. Other policy 
interventions have instead focused on low-income communities regardless of their employment 
in the fossil fuel industry. These include apprenticeships and job carveouts for members of low-
income communities. This approach can be seen as an interconnected response to the financial 
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and employment impacts of CESs. In addition to addressing higher electricity prices through cost 
softening measures, policies can compensate disproportionately affected communities with 
employment opportunities.  
Collectively, CESs carry a range of interconnected distributional impacts that need to be 
managed in order to avoid regressive outcomes. While some empirical evidence on these impacts 
exists, it is primarily based on early-stage CESs that face different challenges than full 
decarbonization. Uncertainty around the financial cost of 100% CESs makes their equity impacts 
difficult to predict. Despite this uncertainty, there is general agreement that CESs will raise 
electricity rates and create jobs. Additionally, there is evidence that many of the clean energy 
programs that often accompany CESs, such as energy efficiency and distributed generation, 
disproportionately benefit high-income households. Without significant policy intervention, the 
evidence points to CESs disproportionately burdening low-income ratepayers, leaving behind 
fossil fuel-dependent communities, and distributing the benefits of clean energy only to those 
that can afford high upfront costs. Among early adopters of 100% CESs, New Mexico, New 
York, Washington, and California have stood out for their efforts to mitigate these regressive 
impacts. The next section analyzes their strategies for equity, providing four detailed case studies 
on the implementation of 100% CESs. 
 
IV. New Mexico’s Just Transition 
 
 
New Mexico made national headlines in March 2019 when it became the third state in the 
U.S. to pass a 100% CES. Compared to similar bills in Hawaii and California, New Mexico’s SB 
489 faced stronger opposition from the fossil fuel industry. The bill has been hailed as an 
equitable guide to the energy transition for its protection of fossil fuel-dependent communities 
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(McNamara 2019). On the other hand, SB 489 has drawn criticism for providing unnecessary aid 
to the fossil fuel industry at the expense of ratepayers and not doing enough to support the Native 
American communities historically disadvantaged by fossil fuel extraction. In this way, New 
Mexico offers a nuanced case study of the tradeoffs that come with prioritizing protections for 
fossil fuel workers in the energy transition. 
New Mexico has rich fossil fuel resources in coal, oil, and natural gas, making it one of 
the top ten producers of energy among all states. New Mexico’s electricity generation mix has 
historically been dominated by coal. Despite challenges from natural gas, as well as emerging 
wind and solar industries, coal-fired power plants remain the primary source of New Mexico’s 
electricity (EIA 2020a). Beyond the electricity sector, New Mexico’s economy relies on fossil 
fuels as its main export, accounting for nearly 1/10th of the state’s GDP (New Mexico Economic 
Development Department 2020). In light of New Mexico’s heavy reliance on fossil fuels, SB 489 
represents not only a drastic transformation for the state’s electricity sector but the economy as a 
whole. Given the potential economic disruptions, New Mexico prioritizes equity in SB 489 
through protections for fossil fuels workers at risk of displacement and their communities. 
The prevalence of Indigenous peoples and their ties to the fossil fuel industry adds to the 
complexity of establishing a CES in New Mexico. The northwest corner of the state, known as 
the Four Corners region, is home to the majority of the state’s fossil fuel infrastructure as well as 
the Navajo Nation and 19 Pueblo tribes (Funes 2019). While significant concerns exist over 
negative health impacts (Willeto 2015), fossil fuel development provides much-needed economic 
opportunities for Indigenous communities. Native Americans in New Mexico have an 
unemployment rate of 16% compared to less than 5% for the general population (Tauli-Corpuz 
2017). Additionally, the economies of two of the largest tribes in New Mexico rely on fossil fuel 
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extraction. Mining employs 3.6% of Jicarilla Apache tribal members and 3.4% of Navajo Nation 
citizens (Tauli-Corpuz 2017). As a result, SB 489 confronts difficult questions of equity not only 
in protecting fossil fuel workers but also in protecting the sovereignty and economic prospects of 
historically disadvantaged Indigenous peoples.  
In addition to updating New Mexico’s CES to 100% by 2050, SB 489 establishes several 
innovative programs intended to protect fossil fuel-dependent communities. These include 
authorizing utilities to issue bonds to recover their lost investments in stranded assets, mandating 
apprenticeships in all new construction of electricity generating facilities, and creating economic 
development funds for affected communities. With these provisions, SB 489 received support 
from a broad coalition composed of major environmental groups, labor unions, the president of 
the Navajo Nation, and New Mexico’s largest public utility.  
Winning support from this coalition was not easy. In particular, the early retirement of 
New Mexico’s coal power plants has been highly contentious. New Mexico’s two largest 
remaining coal power plants, located only 15 miles apart, supply over 40% of the state’s 
electricity (EIA 2020a). These plants and their supporting mines are additionally the primary 
sources of economic activity in the Four Corners Region. Due to their economic significance, SB 
489 directly sets the rules of their retirement. In a highly controversial move, the bill allows the 
operating utility, the Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM), to share the full cost of 
retirement with ratepayers through securitization.  
SB 489 ends a decades-long discussion over the closure of PNM’s San Juan Generating 
Station (SJGS) and PNM’s share in the jointly owned Four Corners Generating Station, setting 
closure deadlines of 2022 and 2031 respectively. Given its more immediate deadline, SJGS has 
been the primary focus of debate and will likely set precedent for the closure of Four Corners 
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Generating Station. PNM was forced to close half of SJGS’s four units, nearly 850 megawatts, to 
comply with the Clean Air Act in 2017 but has continued to fight to keep the remaining two units 
in operation (Petersen 2017). Finally, with SB 489, PNM and the Public Regulation Commission 
have come to an agreement to close SJGS by 2022. Decommissioning their largest power plant is 
not as easy as simply shutting the doors. PNM still holds $320 million in outstanding 
investments at SJGS on which it expected to earn $16 million per year in profits (PNM 2017). 
Despite the plant closure, these debts still need to be paid. Second, retiring the plant and mine 
complex threatens to economically decimate surrounding communities through the loss of 450 
jobs and two essential sources of tax revenue (O’Donnell 2019). Given these politically complex 
considerations, the New Mexico legislature established a new method of early retirement rather 
than allowing PNM to seek traditional cost recovery through the Public Regulation Commission.  
SB 489 allows PNM to issue bonds in order to recover the cost of abandonment from 
ratepayers, essentially refinancing its debt through a process called securitization. Investor-
owned utilities like PNM typically borrow from banks or shareholders at interest rates of seven 
to nine percent to invest in assets like fossil fuel plants. When these plants are retired early due to 
regulation or loss of economic viability, utilities are stuck with expensive debt. Securitization, 
however, allows utilities to substitute these high-interest loans for customer-backed debt with 
rates closer to three percent (Sierra Club 2018). In doing so, utilities forfeit any profit they 
expected to make on the asset. As a result, securitization can significantly soften the cost of 
stranded assets and free up capital to invest in new generation capacity.  
While securitization appears to be the least-cost option for the early retirement of SJGS, 
SB 489 has been criticized for allowing PNM shareholders to recover the full cost of the asset. 
The Legislative Finance Committee estimates that securitization will cost ratepayers $27 million 
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per year through a non-bypassable energy transition charge. This represents significant savings 
for consumers compared to continuing to operate the plant or recovering the costs through 
traditional mechanisms, either of which would cost $45 million per year. Alternatively, it is 
slightly more costly than the $22.5 million per year scenario in which PNM recoups only 50% of 
stranded costs (Legislative Finance Committee). While most environmental groups supported SB 
489, New Energy Economy (2019) strongly opposed the bill on the grounds that ratepayers 
should not bail out PNM’s imprudent investment. In response, Conservation Voters New Mexico 
(2019) refuted the notion that securitization represents a bailout, pointing to PNMs loss of nearly 
$200 million in expected profits. In sum, securitization represents the least-cost compromise that 
limits the impact to ratepayers while allowing PNM to recover its stranded assets.  
Securitization has also opened the door for New Mexico to assist affected communities 
and displaced workers. First, a percentage of all bonds is earmarked for direct transfers to 
displaced workers. Out of $375 million in bonds, up to $20 million go to severance and job 
training for employees who lose their jobs as a result of the abandonment of the generating 
station and associated mine. This represents a direct transfer from ratepayers of nearly $45,000 
per worker. These funds are administered by PNM and left to its discretion. PNMs current 
proposal allots $17.8 million for severance and $2.8 million for job training (PNM 2020). This 
proposal shows a preference for PNM’s directly employed generating station workers over 
workers at the independently owned coal mine. Displaced generating station workers receive 
nine months severance as well as $10,000 per year towards job training. Coal workers receive six 
months severance and a one-time $6,000 scholarship through New Mexico Workforce Solutions 
(PNM 2020). Combined with other provisions in the bill, these funds are intended to transition 
displaced fossil fuel workers into new jobs in renewable resources.  
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In addition to assisting directly displaced workers, SB 489 provides support for affected 
communities that stand to lose tax revenue. SB 489 raises an additional $20 million from 
ratepayers to establish two funds intended to soften the transition for communities that are 
economically dependent on the generating station and associated mines. The smaller of the two 
funds, the Energy Transition Economic Development Assistance Fund, receives 1.65% of bond 
proceeds, estimated at $6 million, to be distributed in the affected county to promote economic 
development opportunities unrelated to fossil fuel use. The exact disbursement of funds is 
subject to a public planning process with at least three meetings held in the affected community. 
The larger fund, The Energy Transition Displaced Worker Assistance Fund, receives 3.35% of 
bond proceeds to be administered by the Workforce Solutions Department. In contrast to the 
severance and job training administered by PNM, the Displaced Worker Assistance Fund applies 
to any worker who loses their job as a result of abandonment, not just PNM employees. This 
fund is used to help displaced workers find new jobs through existing Workforce Solutions 
Department programs as well as certified apprenticeships. 
The above-mentioned programs soften the impacts felt by displaced workers and their 
communities but do not directly transition fossil fuel workers to new jobs in clean energy. To 
complement these programs, SB 489 includes two important provisions with the common goal of 
creating new clean energy jobs in affected communities. First, it establishes an apprenticeship 
mandate to ensure that jobs created by replacement resources are made available to displaced 
workers. The bill requires any construction of a new electricity generating facility to employ 
apprentices as at least 10% of the workforce. This percentage increases to 17.5% in 2024 and 
25% in 2026. Combined with the Displaced Worker Assistance Fund, this mandate creates a 
pipeline for displaced workers to transition to new jobs through fully funded apprenticeship 
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programs. Furthermore, SB 489 directs the Workforce Solutions Department to develop rules 
that encourage diversity in the program specifically targeting disadvantaged communities and 
those that are underrepresented in the industry. 
Second, Section III of the bill outlines regulations for the location of resource 
development after abandonment. The bill directs the Public Regulation Commission to prioritize 
replacement resources based on their economic development opportunity and ability to provide 
jobs with comparable pay and benefits to those lost. PNM is currently in the process of 
proposing replacement resources for SJGS. Their proposed plans reveal the tradeoffs between 
transitioning to clean energy and supporting fossil fuel-dependent communities. The 
abandonment of SJGS represents a total loss of over $9 million of property tax revenue for San 
Juan County, its school district, and its community college (O’Donnell 2019). Initial analysis by 
independent consultant Dr. Kelly O’Donnell (2019) estimates that redevelopment of the plant 
and mine sites with solar PV would more than cover this lost revenue while replacing it with 
natural gas would not. However, PNM’s proposal replaces SJGS with a 280 MW natural gas 
facility while adding 350 MW of solar outside of San Juan County (PNM 2019). Additionally, 
the natural gas facility will need to be replaced with renewables by 2045 to meet CES 
requirements. PNMs choice of natural gas realizes concerns raised by environmental and 
community groups that SB 489 does not offer sufficient oversight of replacement resources 
(New Energy Economy 2019, Cantor 2019). 
Despite receiving an endorsement from the president of the Navajo Nation, Jonathan Nez, 
SB 489 has repeatedly drawn criticism from Indigenous advocates including local Navajo Nation 
chapters (Indigenous Peoples of the Southwest & Allies 2019, Cantor 2019). New Mexico’s 
energy policy decisions disproportionately affect Indigenous communities, yet they are often left 
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out of policymaking. Indigenous ancestral lands in the Four Corners region were officially 
designated a national sacrifice zone by the Department of Energy and experience high levels of 
extractive activities (Indigenous Peoples of the Southwest & Allies 2019). As a result, the fossil 
fuel industry has provided economic opportunity to Indigenous communities but has also 
degraded their land, air, and water. SB 489 protects displaced workers but does not include any 
provisions specific to Indigenous equity except a one time, $1.8 million deposit in the Indian 
Affairs Fund. Regardless, in the case of SJGS, a significant portion of funds will benefit 
Indigenous workers. Navajo workers comprise 27% of the station’s workforce and 50% of the 
coal mine’s labor force. In total, 304 Navajo workers, contractors, and suppliers will qualify as 
displaced workers and receive benefits (PNM 2020). However, for many Indigenous leaders, a 
just transition means not only protecting displaced workers but also reclaiming degraded land 
and providing support for historically disadvantaged communities (Indigenous Peoples of the 
Southwest & Allies 2019). Indigenous advocates proposed multiple amendments that were 
rejected including the full remediation and restoration of impacted areas, support for addressing 
long-term health impacts, support for infrastructure including electricity and roads in frontline 
communities, and consultation with Indigenous groups in all stages of decision making.  
SB 489 highlights the interconnected challenges of addressing distributional equity in 
CESs. New Mexico has clearly decided to prioritize fossil fuel workers and fossil fuel-dependent 
communities. As Indigenous leaders and some environmental groups have pointed out, this 
choice comes at a cost. Most notably, there will be a significant cost to ratepayers in the form of 
a literal line item labeled “energy transition charge.” On top costs to ratepayers comes the 
opportunity cost of choosing not to protect other affected communities. In New Mexico, this 
means that frontline Indigenous communities degraded by fossil fuel extraction will not see 
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specific stimulus or remediation. Thus, SB 489 confronts economic impacts directly related to 
the CES but does not address the historical inequities of the fossil fuel industry. 
Finally, SB 489 has overwhelmingly focused on the retirement of coal power plants, 
leaving uncertainty around natural gas generating infrastructure. The securitization process 
outlined in SB 489 only applies to coal-fired generation. Natural gas currently provides nearly 
the same amount of electricity as coal and is expected to need to increase to replace coal 
resources. There is an implicit assumption that natural gas will serve as a transition resource, but 
no efforts are made to prevent these assets from being stranded when natural gas is phased out by 
2045. While natural gas plants are not as large or concentrated as coal plants, their retirement 
will still have wide-sweeping economic impacts. As it currently stands, local communities 
affected by natural gas plant closures will not benefit from any of the economic development 
programs established in SB 489. New Mexico’s overwhelming focus on the short-term 
retirement of its two remaining coal plants threatens to create significant financial liabilities in 
the long term.  
At least in the short term, New Mexico’s SB 489 provides an excellent blueprint for 
protecting fossil fuel workers and their communities from the economic impacts of the early 
retirement of fossil fuel generating facilities. As opposition from indigenous advocates and 
environmental groups has shown, not everyone considers this a sufficient benchmark of a just 
transition. It does, however, reflect the reality of New Mexico’s political landscape. With some 
caveats, SB 489 offers lessons on how energy-producing states can soften the local economic 
impacts that CESs impose on fossil fuel-dependent communities. 
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V. California’s Cost Softening 
 
 Higher electricity prices present a particularly difficult challenge for California where 
rates are already nearly twice the national average (EIA 2019c). Fortunately, as an early adopter 
of clean energy, California has a roadmap for balancing affordability, reliability, and clean 
energy targets. California was building out utility-scale solar as early as the 1980s when the 
economics were far less favorable (St. John 2019). The state’s legacy of expensive renewable 
energy contracts and early retirement of cheap nuclear and fossil fuel plants have led to some of 
the most expensive electricity rates in the country. Despite these high rates per kWh, California 
has managed to keep monthly electricity bills affordable through a long-term commitment to cost 
softening programs. As California approaches full decarbonization, these programs will be 
essential for maintaining energy affordability, especially for California’s most vulnerable 
communities.  
 When California passed SB 100 in 2018, mandating that utilities achieve net-zero carbon 
emissions by 2045, it did not signal a drastic change but rather marginally extended a long 
history of clean energy policy. Thus, it is essential to consider not only SB 100 but also its policy 
context. While SB 100 does not adopt any new provisions focused on equity, its adverse 
distributional impacts will be mitigated by a robust suite of supporting policies. These policies 
focus on softening costs to ratepayers through energy efficiency, weatherization, and direct rate 
assistance. California’s unique cap-and-trade system also plays an essential role in supporting SB 
100 by generating revenue to fund some of these programs.  
 Prior to SB 100, California already had one of the highest clean energy targets in the 
United States. SB 350, passed in 2015, set a mandate for 50% of the state’s electricity to come 
from renewable resources (not including nuclear and large hydro) by 2030. SB 100 raised this 
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target to 60% and further mandated that by 2045 the remaining 40% of electricity generation 
achieve net-zero carbon emissions. In addition to laying the foundation for SB 100, SB 350 
combined the CES with an energy efficiency mandate. The mandate requires utilities to double 
the projected energy efficiency savings of retail customers by 2030, equating to roughly 80,000 
GWh of electricity savings (CEC 2017). This goal would significantly soften the total costs felt 
by consumers by reducing their overall usage. Furthermore, SB 350 directs the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC) to prioritize low-income and disadvantaged communities for these 
energy efficiency savings. With this provision, the energy efficiency mandate serves as a 
powerful tool to counteract the regressivity of electricity rate increases associated with the CES.  
Due to the high upfront costs of energy efficiency improvements, the CPUC administers 
specific ratepayer-funded programs to lower barriers to access for low-income households and 
ensure these goals are met. These programs broadly represent indirect cost softening measures 
that make electricity more affordable by reducing overall usage. A common challenge with 
indirect cost softening programs arises from the low level of homeownership among income-
qualified households, which can make it difficult to direct the benefits to the intended recipients. 
For example, the Energy Savings Assistance Program (ESA) provides no-cost weatherization 
services and energy efficient appliances to households with a total income below 200% of the 
federal poverty line or that are enrolled in other public assistance programs such as 
Medicaid/Medi-Cal (CPUC 2019). However, of the roughly 13 million Californians that qualify 
for ESA, nearly 6 million are renters, the majority of which reside in multifamily units (EEFA 
2018). Multifamily renters have historically utilized ESA at a disproportionately low rate despite 
experiencing higher energy burdens (EEFA 2018). Misaligned benefits between owners and 
renters are primarily to blame for preventing the deployment of ESA in these households. As a 
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result, many of the most energy burdened individuals have been precluded from accessing ESA. 
Thus, while ESA represents an overall transfer from higher-income ratepayers to lower-income 
ratepayers, the benefits are concentrated in the relatively wealthier subset of low-income 
ratepayers who own homes.  
Direct rate assistance offers an easier way to direct cost softening to low-income 
ratepayers, but it does not have the same environmental benefits as energy efficiency. California 
has two programs that subsidize the price of electricity for low-income households, California 
Alternate Rates for Energy (CARE) and Family Electric Rate Assistance Program (FERA). 
CARE provides a 30-35% discount on electricity for households below 200% of the federal 
poverty line and FERA provides a smaller discount of 18% to families that fall between 200 and 
250% of the federal poverty line (CPUC 2020a). Similar to ESA, these programs are funded 
entirely by charges to higher-income ratepayers. While these direct rate assistance programs will 
continue to provide crucial support for around one-third of Californians, they have limited room 
for expansion. The state sees far more potential in indirect cost softening programs such as ESA 
despite their distributional challenges. 
In addition to softening costs for low-income households, California protects households 
that may be disadvantaged in other ways. California identifies these disadvantaged communities 
through a cumulative impact assessment known as CalEnviroScreen. The assessment identifies 
communities (defined as census tracts) that are at the highest risk of environmental harm, taking 
into account both levels of environmental pollution and population characteristics (Office of 
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment 2017). CalEnviroScreen assesses communities based 
on 20 distinct indicators that measure exposure (e.g. PM 2.5 concentration), environmental 
effects (e.g. number of hazardous waste facilities), population sensitivity (e.g. rate of asthma) 
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and socioeconomic factors (e.g. educational attainment). Using these indicators, 
CalEnviroScreen produces an aggregate score for each census tract. Census tracts scoring in the 
highest 25% are designated “disadvantaged communities” under California law. Collectively, 
these indicators offer a more nuanced approach to equity than income levels alone. 
Environmental pollution indicators incorporate communities that suffer disproportionately from 
environmental damages, especially those caused by the fossil fuel industry. Population 
characteristic indicators go a step further to address underlying systemic inequities that have led 
some communities to be more vulnerable. California’s approach paved the way for other states, 
including Washington and New York, to incorporate complex definitions of equity into clean 
energy policy through cumulative impact assessments. 
CalEnviroScreen enables California to go beyond softening individual households’ costs 
to reinvest in entire communities. Most notably, the legislature has used CalEnviroScreen to 
direct funds raised by California’s cap-and-trade program to disadvantaged communities. 
California’s cap-and-trade program raises revenue each year by auctioning off emissions 
allowances to polluting companies. Cap-and-trade auction proceeds fund community investments 
through California Climate Investments (CCI). These projects include affordable housing, 
renewable energy, public transportation, zero-emission vehicles, environmental restoration, 
sustainable agriculture, and recycling initiatives (CalEPA 2017). When cap-and-trade was 
implemented in 2012, SB 535 required 25% of the proceeds to fund projects that provide benefits 
to disadvantaged communities. Later in 2016, AB 1550 tightened this restriction such that these 
projects must be located within disadvantaged communities, not just benefit them. Secondly, AB 
1550 apportioned an additional ten percent to low-income households or communities. While the 
primary goal of the cap-and-trade program is to reduce GHG emissions, many of the projects 
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funded through CCI soften costs for ratepayers in disadvantaged communities through 
investments in energy efficiency and distributed generation. In this way, disadvantaged 
communities are protected from adverse impacts of California’s CES through reinvestment 
funded by cap-and-trade. The Solar on Multifamily Affordable Housing (SOMAH) Program is 
an excellent example of such reinvestment. 
SOMAH showcases the potential for cap-and-trade proceeds to mitigate the electricity 
rate impact of SB 100 for low-income and disadvantaged communities. The program directs $1 
billion over ten years to subsidize solar energy systems on multifamily affordable housing units 
with the explicit goal of developing solar capacity in disadvantaged communities and decreasing 
energy bills for low-income tenants (CPUC 2020b). SOMAH was the first program in the U.S. to 
direct the savings created through the use of solar energy back to the utility bills of renters 
(CEJA 2015). In this way, the program breaks barriers that have historically excluded the most 
energy burdened households from accessing the cost savings from solar. SOMAH shows how 
CCI’s community-based approach can unlock savings beyond programs targeting individual 
households.  
SOMAH has also revealed increasing polarization between labor unions and 
environmental justice organizations over distributed generation versus utility-scale solar. While 
rooftop solar can soften costs for low-income ratepayers, it does not create the same high-quality, 
union jobs as utility-scale solar. California has had success creating high-quality jobs by utilizing 
federally protected project labor agreements in the construction of utility-scale renewable energy 
projects. Almost all large-scale renewable energy projects have used collective bargaining 
agreements ensuring high wages as well as health benefits and pension plans. Additionally, 
project labor agreements employ apprentices under the state-certified apprenticeship system. 
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Under these apprenticeships, entry-level, unskilled workers obtain free training, a job, and a path 
toward a middle-class career. Rooftop solar, on the other hand, does not utilize project labor 
agreements and instead creates low-quality jobs with little opportunity for advancement (Zabin et 
al. 2016). In this way, utility-scale solar offers a competing strategy for equity through economic 
opportunity rather than cost softening.  
A study by the UC Berkeley Labor Center found that project labor agreements are 
creating opportunities for workers from disadvantaged communities. In 2017, people of color 
represented 60% of new apprentices compared to 57% of the workforce as a whole and workers 
from disadvantaged communities, representing 25% of the state’s population, filled 43% of 
entry-level solar power plant construction jobs (Luke et al. 2017). While distributed generation, 
especially in disadvantaged communities, also creates jobs for workers from disadvantaged 
communities, the jobs do not have the same economic benefits. A key step towards uniting labor 
unions and environmental justice groups is adopting stricter labor standards for energy efficiency 
and distributed generation. Combining cost softening with economic development in this way 
would not only mitigate the impacts of the CES but also further California’s goals to invest in 
disadvantaged communities. 
For the most part, California has focused on making clean energy jobs accessible to low-
income and disadvantaged workers. Transitioning fossil fuel workers into the clean economy has 
proved more difficult, especially due to uncertainty around the future of natural gas electricity 
generation. SB 100 loosely defines the final 40% of California’s CES as zero-emissions. This 
leaves the door open for large hydro, nuclear, and importantly, gas-fired power plants with 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). This option depends on the commercial viability of 
CCS, a still unproven technology. Additionally, concerns have been raised over a loophole that 
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could keep some natural gas-fired power plants running. Southern California Edison has argued 
that the CES only covers electricity sold to retail customers, not the 7-8% of electricity lost in 
transmission (S&P Global 2019). This interpretation would allow natural gas to continue to 
provide 7-8% of the total electricity generated. The CPUC has yet to make a definitive decision, 
setting up an impending regulatory battle. This uncertainty over the future of natural gas 
generation has overshadowed transition plans for these workers. Regardless of the final ruling, 
the natural gas workforce will be significantly reduced and replaced by clean energy workers. 
California has gone to great lengths to shield low-income households and disadvantaged 
communities from the effects of the transition to clean energy but has not prioritized fossil fuel 
workers in the same way.  
Overall, California’s experience balancing affordability, reliability, and clean energy 
targets has centered equity in the policy framework supporting SB 100. Specifically, California 
(1) mitigates the impact of high electricity rates through cost-softening measures targeted 
towards low-income ratepayers, (2) directs investment in clean energy and energy efficiency to 
disadvantaged communities, and (3) ensures clean energy jobs are both high paying and made 
available to members of disadvantaged communities. California’s framework shows a strong 
preference for protecting low-income households and disadvantaged communities often at the 
expense of the fossil fuel industry. This preference reflects renewable energy developers’ and 
environmental justice advocates’ powerful influence in California’s progressive legislature. 
While California provides a tested model for protecting low-income households and 
disadvantaged communities, this approach is unlikely to succeed in states with more 
conservative legislatures or more powerful fossil fuel interests. 
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VI. New York’s Green New Deal 
 
New York’s CES legislation, known as the Climate Leadership and Community 
Protection Act (CLCPA), stands out as one of the most ambitious state-level clean energy 
policies in the United States. The CLCPA not only mandates 100% clean energy from the 
electricity sector by 2040 but also mandates net-zero emissions from the economy as a whole by 
2050. This provision significantly expands the scope of the CLCPA beyond typical CES 
legislation. Electricity generation is only the third-largest source of GHG emissions in New 
York, trailing both transportation and fossil fuel combustion in buildings (NYSERDA 2018). 
Decarbonizing these two additional sectors will require switching to electric alternatives 
powered by a carbon-free grid. In this way, the CLCPA will not only change the nature of 
electricity generation but will also drastically increase the demand for electricity. Collectively, 
these mandates represent a complete transition of New York’s economy to a clean energy 
economy.  
 Recognizing the fundamental transformation that the CLCPA represents, environmental 
justice groups have led the charge to ensure that the act incorporates equity as an integral 
component. NY Renews, a coalition of nearly 200 environmental, labor, and social justice 
organizations paved the way for the CLCPA when it introduced the Climate and Community 
Protection Act (CCPA). The final CLCPA is a combination of the CCPA and Governor Cuomo’s 
Climate Leadership Act that maintains the core emphasis on equity advocated by NY Renews. 
The bill itself not only acknowledges the heightened vulnerability of disadvantaged communities 
but asserts that clean energy policy should prioritize the health of disadvantaged communities, 
control regressive impacts of future climate change policies, and allocate public investments in 
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these communities (§ 75-0101.7). With these lofty goals, the CLCPA is not only one of the most 
ambitious clean energy policies but also arguably the most ideologically progressive. 
 The CLCPA delegates the implementation of its ambitious goals to the newly created 
Climate Action Council (CAC). The 22 members of the council are tasked with determining how 
New York will achieve the emissions targets established by the CLCPA. The CAC consists of 12 
commissioners and presidents of state agencies as well as two members appointed by the 
governor, three each by the majority leaders of the house and the senate, and one each by the 
minority leaders. The appointees cover a range of business leaders, government officials, 
environmental advocates, and academics. Raya Salter, an attorney with NY Renews, and Peter 
Iwanowicz, executive director of Environmental Advocates of New York, stand out as proven 
advocates for environmental justice (French 2020). On the other side, the minority leaders’ 
appointments provide two voices for the fossil fuel industry in Gavin Donohue of the 
Independent Power Producers of New York and Donna DeCarolis, a fuel executive with National 
Fuel Gas (New York Climate Action Council 2020). The CAC is responsible for developing a 
scoping plan to achieve the goals set out in the CLCPA. In this way, these 22 councilmembers 
have immense power to shape the priorities of the CES.  
While the CAC has the final say on the act’s implementation, they are required to 
incorporate newly created advisory groups in the planning process, including the Climate Justice 
Working Group and the Just Transition Working Group. The Just Transition Working Group, 
chaired by the commissioner of labor, is responsible for providing recommendations to the 
council on opportunities for workforce development with a focus on disadvantaged communities 
and members of groups underrepresented in the energy industry. In addition to advising the 
Climate Action Council on issues of environmental justice, the Climate Justice Working Group 
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is tasked with defining and identifying “disadvantaged communities” for the purpose of the 
CLCPA. This definition is crucial for determining the recipients of specific protections and 
carveouts created in other parts of the act. The act includes guidelines for the Climate Justice 
Working Group which offer insight into what communities the act’s equity provisions are 
intended to prioritize.  
 Disadvantaged communities, according to the CLCPA, will be identified through a 
cumulative impact assessment with three main metrics: public health, socioeconomic status, and 
climate vulnerability. Under public health criteria, the act directs the Climate Justice Working 
Group to identify areas burdened by “cumulative environmental pollution.” By protecting 
communities burdened by cumulative environmental pollution, New York acknowledges and 
seeks to address historical environmental inequities, not just current ones. Similarly, in defining 
criteria for socioeconomic status, the CLCPA includes communities with high concentrations of 
members of groups that have historically experienced discrimination on the basis of race or 
ethnicity. Diverging from other states, New York uses its CES to explicitly address racial 
inequity. Furthermore, the prioritization of climate-vulnerable communities represents a novel 
approach to equity in CESs. The CLCPA not only identifies disadvantaged communities who are 
burdened with the extractive pollution of the fossil fuel industry but also those that are at higher 
risk of the impacts of climate change. The bill lists flooding, storm surges, and urban heat island 
effects as examples of potential impacts.  
While the CLCPA provides some oversight, the bulk of the process is left up to the 
Climate Justice Working Group. The guidelines do not cover how crucial terms, such as 
“cumulative environmental pollution,” will be defined or what sources of data should be used. 
The Climate Justice Working Group faces an extremely difficult task balancing the myriad of 
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criteria outlined in the CLCPA such that disadvantaged communities are accurately identified but 
not so liberally included as to dilute their protections. Importantly, the CLCPA emphasizes 
community engagement in the development of these criteria. The Climate Justice Working 
Group is required to publish a draft list of criteria and disadvantaged communities and then hold 
six public hearings before finalizing their decision. New York’s use of community engagement is 
fundamental to its commitment to equity. 
 The CLCPA prioritizes disadvantaged communities, however they are identified, through 
a variety of measures. Most notably, § 75-0117 of the CLCPA requires that 35% of the “overall 
benefits of spending” go to disadvantaged communities and aims for 40%. While the regulation 
appears ambitiously progressive on paper, it is full of ambiguity. The language has been 
significantly loosened from earlier drafts of the bill. The bill initially mandated the state to 
allocate 40% of existing climate and clean energy funding, roughly $370 million, to 
disadvantaged communities for community determined climate solutions. PUSH, one of NY 
Renews core members, has criticized the final bill for eliminating this clear and immediate 
investment in favor of an ambiguous and unenforceable goal (Bono 2019). Furthermore, the final 
version shifts the decision-making power from communities themselves to state agencies. 
Regardless, this goal represents an unparalleled commitment to distribute the benefits of the 
clean energy transition to historically marginalized communities.  
 In addition to economic benefits, the CLCPA aims to direct reductions of environmental 
pollution to disadvantaged communities. First, the community air monitoring program 
specifically targets disadvantaged communities with high exposure to toxic air contaminants and 
criteria air pollutants. The Department of Environmental Conservation will identify high priority 
locations in disadvantaged communities to deploy air monitoring systems. These systems will 
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measure concentrations of local pollutants and make the data publicly available. The department 
will use these systems to assess and identify contributing sources and then prepare a strategy to 
reduce emissions from these sources. The final result will be locally tailored community 
emissions reduction programs implemented by the department. Secondly, a separate section of 
the act requires that, in meeting its GHG reduction goals, the state prioritizes projects that 
eliminate criteria pollutants in historically disadvantaged communities. In this way, the CLCPA 
couples local co-pollutants with GHG emissions to influence where emission reductions occur 
and what communities they benefit.  
 In the electricity sector specifically, the CLCPA uses technology carveouts to ensure that 
disadvantaged communities receive environmental benefits. The bill directs the regulatory 
commission to prioritize the deployment of clean energy technologies, including battery storage 
and distributed solar, in disadvantaged communities. Furthermore, the battery storage mandate 
aims to replace fossil fuel peaking plants that disproportionately harm disadvantaged 
communities. Peaking power plants are those which only operate during the highest periods of 
demand and tend to be the oldest and most polluting. In New York, these plants are 
disproportionately located in low-income communities and communities of color (Spector 2019). 
The CLCPA intends to replace these plants with battery storage that can provide the same 
peaking service with zero emissions. Batteries can be charged during periods of low demand 
when solar and wind are abundant and then dispatched during periods of high demand when 
New York would otherwise have to turn to peaking plants. The CLCPA mandates a staggering 
three gigawatts of battery storage by 2035 with a yet-to-be-determined minimum percentage 
located in disadvantaged communities. For reference, the entire U.S. currently has less than one 
gigawatt of battery storage capacity (EIA 2019a). New York’s investment in this expensive and 
 37 
underdeveloped technology signals its commitment to delivering environmental benefits to 
disadvantaged communities, even if it comes at a high cost. 
Beyond these specific carveouts, it is not entirely clear how the general equity provisions 
in the CLCPA will manifest themselves in the electricity sector. The equity considerations 
relevant to the CES in isolation will depend on the interpretation and application of fairly 
ambiguous goals. For example, it is unclear what, if any, “overall benefits of spending” will 
result from a mandate on renewable electricity generation. It is possible that job creation and 
economic development from renewable energy would qualify as an overall benefit, in which case 
the Public Services Commission would have to ensure that 35% of these benefits go to 
disadvantaged communities. While this provision would be difficult to enforce, it could 
significantly raise the cost of compliance by limiting where new projects can be located.  
 Despite demands from labor unions and environmental justice advocates, the final 
CLCPA does not contain strong labor provisions for a just transition. The originally introduced 
bill included labor and training standards as a foundational equity component. However, over the 
legislative process, these protections were slowly stripped away culminating in Governor Cuomo 
striking them entirely. The proposed provisions would have provided a safety net for displaced 
fossil fuel workers, ensured competitive wages for renewable energy workers, and established 
apprenticeship and workforce development programs (NY Renews 2018). Furthermore, the 
original bill included economic dependence on fossil fuels as a fourth criterion for identifying 
disadvantaged communities, but the final bill excludes this provision. These last-minute 
amendments stripped protections for both existing fossil fuel workers and future clean energy 
workers. With the absence of these stipulations, the final CLCPA contains next to no language 
related to workforce impacts. The sole section addressed towards labor, § 5, reads, “this act shall 
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be subject to current prevailing wage law.” Despite some pushback, the CLCPA kept its support 
from key labor coalitions including SEIU (Roberts 2019 b). NY Renews has since turned 
towards pressuring the Climate Action Council to prioritize workers’ rights in their eventual 
scoping plan (NY Renews 2020).  
The CLCPA and its CES are undoubtedly cutting edge both in their targets and 
commitment to equity. However, New York’s ability to achieve the equitable transition it 
envisions will depend entirely on the act’s implementation. Relative to other CESs, the CLCPA 
more closely resembles a loose amalgamation of goals. If enacted as intended, the CLCPA could 
live up to its reputation as the precursor to the Green New Deal (Calma 2019). On the other 
hand, New York may run into political and economic difficulties and have to choose between 
staying true to its principles of equity and achieving the overarching goals it set out to achieve. In 
this case, the last-minute weakening of equity provisions will show, as binding GHG reduction 
commitments are pitted against ambiguous and unenforceable equity metrics. Regardless, New 
York’s CLCPA presents an innovative approach to clean energy equity that addresses not just 
immediate distributional impacts but also attempts to remedy historical and future environmental 
injustice. 
 
VII. Washington’s Utility Business Model Reform 
 
 With an abundance of renewable resources and some of the lowest electricity rates in the 
country, Washington is well positioned to lead the way in the transition to clean energy. In May 
2019, Governor Jay Inslee signed SB 5116, known as The Clean Energy Transformation Act 
(CETA), to mandate the transition to 100% clean energy by 2045. Washington already produces 
more renewable energy than any other state with more than two-thirds of its electricity coming 
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from large hydroelectric generating stations (EIA 2019b). Due to the low operating costs of these 
facilities, Washington also has some of the cheapest electricity nationwide. Despite already 
having the third-lowest electricity rates in the country, Washington prioritizes maintaining 
affordability in CETA (EIA 2019b). Electricity affordability is particularly important in 
Washington due to high levels of electrification. Nearly 60% of Washington consumers heat 
their homes with electricity compared to less than 40% nationwide (EIA 2019b and U.S. Census 
Bureau 2018). Furthermore, Washington is pushing to increase this percentage in order to reduce 
carbon emissions from natural gas heating. As a result, rate increases are more regressive in 
Washington compared to in other states where a smaller fraction of consumers’ energy needs are 
met by electricity. To address this concern, CETA heavily weighs equity and energy 
affordability in the transition to clean energy. While Washington’s transition to 100% clean 
electricity requires less extreme measures than most states’, CETA still offers important lessons 
for equity strategies in CESs. CETA establishes the tools necessary to prioritize equity 
effectively through utility business model reform and cumulative impact assessment.  
 CETA implements a unique step-up CES that enables utilities to minimize compliance 
costs. Initially, it phases out all coal-fired production, currently 14% of total electricity 
generation in the state, by 2025 (EIA 2019b). Secondly, it requires utilities to be carbon neutral 
by 2030. In the same year, CETA mandates that 80% of electricity must come from non-emitting 
resources (i.e. renewables, nuclear, or natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration) while 
20% can be produced by emitting resources and then offset in any one of three ways. First, 
utilities can buy renewable energy credits from other utilities or independent power producers 
who produced excess renewable energy. This is a common market-based mechanism used in 
most CESs. Second, utilities can make an alternative compliance payment amounting to 
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$100/tCO2e. Washington’s CES stands out for its potential to generate revenues through these 
alternative compliance payments. CETA directs these revenues, as well as any other non-
compliance fees, to the Low-Income Weatherization and Structural Rehabilitation Assistance 
Fund. The fund is to be used to maximize monetary and energy savings for low-income 
households through energy efficiency and weatherization. In this way, these compliance 
payments represent a transfer from non-compliant utilities to low-income consumers. The extent 
to which utilities will use these alternative compliance payments is currently unknown. 
Regardless, they represent an innovative strategy for directing CES proceeds towards cost 
softening measures for low-income households. 
The third way utilities can offset emitting resources is by engaging in energy 
transformation projects (ETPs) in local communities. These projects must reduce fossil fuel 
consumption and GHG emissions while providing energy related benefits to utility customers. 
ETPs could include weatherization, rooftop solar, electric car infrastructure, or renewable natural 
gas projects for heating and cooking. This compliance mechanism can unlock cost effective 
GHG reduction strategies that fall outside the scope of a traditional CES. For utilities struggling 
to reliably and affordably decarbonize the final 20%, ETPs offer a low-cost way to reduce 
emissions while still providing benefits to local customers. Collectively, these alternative 
compliance mechanisms are designed to ease the transition from 2030 to 2045, the year in which 
the bill requires 100% of electricity to come from non-emitting sources.  
 CETA overhauls the traditional utility business model to align shareholder incentives 
with newly established state policy goals. Investor-owned utilities (IOUs) throughout the U.S. 
make profits exclusively from return on capital, which incentivizes them to pursue capital 
intensive investments like power plants and distribution infrastructure. Under this model, IOUs 
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have no incentive to encourage energy efficiency or distributed generation. In fact, consumers 
producing their own electricity, for example through residential solar panels, actually reduces the 
profits that utilities can make. As a result, utilities have to be forced by regulation to institute 
programs for energy efficiency or distributed generation. CETA enables the Utilities and 
Transportation Commission (UTC) to shift utilities from a return on capital to a performance-
based business model. A performance-based model fundamentally changes the profit motive of 
IOUs. Under this structure, the UTC could establish different parameters to determine returns on 
investment. Rather than purely making returns off of capital investment, utilities could earn 
profits from achieving GHG reduction goals or equity metrics. This approach would give the 
UTC unprecedented leverage to prioritize equity through monetary incentives. For example, the 
UTC could set higher rates of return for utilities that meet targets for installing distributed energy 
resources in disadvantaged communities. While specific performance criteria are not defined in 
the bill, utility business model reform offers a novel way to center equity in the clean energy 
transition. 
 In addition to granting more power to the UTC, the bill directly modifies the regulatory 
compact taken on by utilities. The regulatory compact is essentially the agreement that utilities 
make in order to be granted monopoly power over the electricity market. The traditional 
regulatory compact obligates utilities to provide reliable power to every consumer at the lowest 
possible cost (Roberts 2019a). While states can prioritize other considerations through 
regulation, from the utility’s perspective this regulatory compact legally determines their 
decision making. CETA adds new obligations to the regulatory compact for utilities in 
Washington. For example, the bill requires utilities to incorporate the social cost of carbon, as 
established by executive order, into all decision making. The social cost of carbon is initially set 
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at $68/tCO2e but will rise to $116/tCO2e by 2050. When utilities are deciding what resources to 
develop or assessing the cost of conservation policies, their analysis must include the social cost 
of carbon. The new regulatory compact also forces utilities to prioritize equity. The bill mandates 
that, in all decision making, utilities must “ensure that all consumers are benefitting from the 
transition to clean energy through the equitable distribution of energy and nonenergy benefits 
and reduction of burdens to vulnerable populations and highly impacted communities” (Sec. 
4.(8)). In this way, CETA fundamentally incorporates equity into the utility’s decision-making 
process.  
Through its equity goals, CETA protects communities at risk of environmental harm as 
well as Washington’s Indigenous communities. In the regulatory compact, CETA establishes two 
designations for protected communities, “highly impacted communities” and “vulnerable 
populations.” The state Department of Health determines “highly impacted communities” 
through a cumulative impact assessment similar to California’s CalEnviroScreen. The 
assessment designates communities based on their exposure to adverse impacts of fossil fuel 
production and their vulnerability to climate change. Furthermore, the bill designates any census 
tract that contains Indigenous land as a “highly impacted community.” This is an important 
inclusion for the more than 200,000 Indigenous residents in Washington. Unlike New Mexico’s, 
Washington’s fossil fuel production is not generally located on Indigenous land. Therefore, 
including all Indigenous land as “highly impacted communities” primarily addresses historical 
inequity unrelated to fossil fuel production or climate change. CETA directly defines criteria for 
“vulnerable populations.” These include people from communities that experience a 
disproportionate risk from environmental burdens due to socioeconomic stressors such as high 
unemployment rates or sensitivity factors, such as low birth weight. 
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In addition to incorporating protections for highly impacted communities into utility 
decision making, the bill takes concrete steps to protect low-income ratepayers from rate 
increases. First, CETA sets a limit of 2% of annual revenue on the incremental cost that the CES 
can impose on utilities. The incremental cost of the CES is determined by comparing the cost of 
the utility’s compliant portfolio against a baseline portfolio of least-cost technologies. If the 
incremental cost is projected to exceed 2% of the utility’s annual revenue, the UTC extends that 
utility’s deadline for the CES. Initial analysis from both E3 and Climate Solutions suggests that 
this possibility is highly unlikely over the duration of the CES (Olson and Ming 2019, Hall and 
Gutman 2018). In the event that the CES proves more expensive than expected, the 2% cap 
limits costs to utilities, protecting consumers from sudden rate increases.  
CETA also establishes comprehensive cost softening measures that target low-income 
ratepayers through an energy assistance mandate. The bill requires every utility in Washington to 
establish programs and make funding available for energy assistance starting in 2021. 
Furthermore, these programs must prioritize low-income households with high energy burdens. 
The structure of this program directly ties energy assistance goals to equity outcomes. Energy 
assistance covers any program designed to reduce energy bills including weatherization, energy 
efficiency improvements, distributed generation, or even direct rate assistance. Under the bill, the 
state Department of Commerce has established a target of no more than 6% of household income 
to be spent on energy bills (Washington State Department of Commerce 2020). The UTC is now 
assessing the level of energy assistance necessary to achieve this target. CETA sets a goal of 
meeting 60% of energy assistance need by 2030 and 90% by 2050. Utilities are held accountable 
through biannual reports to the UTC. By setting goals based on this clear metric of energy 
 44 
burden, CETA directly funnels energy assistance measures to those who are most affected by 
electricity rate increases.  
On the production side, CETA establishes tax credits for clean energy construction that 
incentivize targeted hiring and collective bargaining agreements. The tax credit is structured in 
three tiers of increasing requirements. Clean energy projects qualify for a 50% tax credit if they 
prove to the Department of Labor and Industries that they have (1) procured from and contracted 
with women-, minority- or veteran-owned businesses, (2) utilized apprenticeship programs, and 
(3) shown a preference for hiring local workers (Sec. 18.(1).). Clean energy projects that meet 
these criteria can qualify for an even greater tax credit of 75% if they compensate all workers at 
prevailing union wage rates. Finally, clean energy projects qualify for a 100% tax credit if they 
are constructed under a collective bargaining agreement or project labor agreement. This piece of 
the bill was crucial to earning the support of renewable energy developers and labor unions. 
While the requirements strongly encourage union involvement, it remains to be seen how 
stringently the Department of Labor and Industries will enforce requirements for involvement of 
women- and minority-owned businesses. Furthermore, the bill does not include any protections 
for displaced fossil fuel workers.  
Although the bill contains limited equity considerations for displaced workers, changes to 
the regulatory compact may lead to greater equity in energy production. If utilities truly ensure 
that the benefits of the transition to clean energy are distributed equitably, as the bill mandates, 
then they must address equity in the construction and operation of new clean energy facilities. 
However, it is unclear how this provision will be enforced and what extent of the utilities’ 
responsibilities the new regulatory compact will cover. For these reasons, CETA provides far 
more robust protections for consumers than it does for energy workers. Furthermore, while the 
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bill sets concrete protections for consumers based on income, the provisions for highly impacted 
communities are less material. Washington’s utility business model reform represents an 
ambitious and innovative approach to prioritizing equity, but its outcomes for disadvantaged 
communities will depend entirely on the state’s ability to enforce a novel regulatory compact. 
 
VIII. Lessons Learned 
 
This section presents a comparative analysis of the four case studies, with the goal of 
identifying generalized lessons that can be applied to other states. The overview compares key 
elements of each states’ CES (summarized in Table 1). Next, I examine in detail three common 
design considerations: cost softening, the workforce transition, and reparational equity. Finally, I 
discuss the role of CESs in the larger context of clean energy equity and social justice. 
Overview 
States differ significantly not only in the policy mechanisms they utilize but also in their 
fundamental approaches to equity. Whereas New Mexico prioritizes fossil fuel producers and 
fossil fuel-dependent communities, New York, California, and Washington focus their 
protections on ratepayers and disadvantaged communities. California in particular aims to 
balance ambitious clean energy goals with affordability. New York and Washington more 
aggressively pursue equity, including justice for historical inequity, with less concern for 
ratepayer costs.  
New Mexico stands out as the only state to wholly prioritize impacts on producers. This 
reflects both the gravity of the impacts on New Mexico’s producers as well as the state’s 
economic dependence on fossil fuels. The impacts felt by fossil fuel producers will be greater in 
New Mexico than in other states. For example, New Mexico and Washington both rapidly phase 
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out coal. However, coal currently provides nearly half of New Mexico’s electricity compared to 
only 14% of Washington’s (EIA 2019b, EIA 2020a). As a result, New Mexico’s CES represents 
a larger and more abrupt contraction of the fossil fuel industry that will have more severe 
economic impacts. On top of this, New Mexico’s economy is both more fragile and more 
dependent on energy than the other states. New Mexico’s decision to prioritize fossil fuel 
producers and fossil fuel-dependent communities is not purely a reflection of political values; it 
is more so a result of economic realities. The New Mexico case shows that 100% CES are 
feasible in even the most fossil fuel-dependent states as long as the workers and communities are 
adequately protected.  
New York, California, and Washington are able to prioritize consumers because they face 
relatively smoother economic transitions. However, there is no clear method for protecting 
consumers, nor even consistency on which consumers are being protected. California attempts to 
minimize the financial impacts to ratepayers through a suite of cost softening programs. These 
programs include both direct rate assistance as well as energy efficiency and distributed 
generation. In this way, California shields its most vulnerable ratepayers from some of the 
highest electricity rates in the country. New York and Washington, on the other hand, attempt to 
integrate equity into their CES at a foundational level.  
Their foundational approaches are ambitious but could be too loosely defined to 
implement effectively. The effectiveness of New York’s mandate that 35% of the overall 
benefits of spending go to disadvantaged communities depends entirely on how “benefits of 
spending” are determined. California first implemented cap-and-trade with a similar provision. 
However, it ran into challenges interpreting “benefits” and responded by tightening the 
legislation so that the projects must be located in disadvantaged communities, not just benefit 
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them. New York could run into similar difficulties measuring and enforcing the overall 
distribution of benefits. Likewise, the effectiveness of Washington’s new regulatory compact 
will depend entirely on how its terms are interpreted. Specifically, the state is currently 
deliberating on what exactly “the equitable distribution of energy and nonenergy benefits” 
means. As far as enforcement, Washington gives the public utilities commission unprecedented 
power through fundamental reform of the utility business model. New York and Washington’s 
partial successes reveal the importance of effective enforcement mechanisms and clear metrics to 
achieve meaningful equity outcomes.  
All three states go beyond simply protecting low-income ratepayers to also protect 
members of vulnerable communities. New York and Washington both follow California’s lead 
by adopting cumulative impact assessments to identify disadvantaged communities. While all 
three assessments generally target communities that face disproportionate risk from 
environmental burdens, their criteria differ. New York and Washington both emphasize climate 
vulnerability and historical inequity, whereas California uses a stricter health-based approach. 
While New York and Washington identify communities that are at risk of climate related 
disasters such as floods and heatwaves, California does not. Secondly, on racial equity, 
California uses indicators correlated with race but does not explicitly address racial equity. 
Conversely, New York includes racial demographics as an indicator, and Washington 
automatically includes indigenous communities. These states’ strong economies and progressive 
legislatures have afforded them the opportunity to aggressively protect disadvantaged 
communities. There is no clear blueprint for who should be prioritized and what methods will be 
most effective. As a result, these three states will play an important role in piloting experimental 
approaches to equity from which other states can learn.  
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While states’ approaches to equity vary dramatically, several common policy design 
considerations have emerged. These include choosing cost softening mechanisms, managing 
industry interests in the workforce transition, and using clean energy policy to address historical 
inequities. Any state considering a 100% CES will need to grapple with these crucial policy 
design elements.  
Cost Softening: Direct Rate Assistance vs. Energy Efficiency  
States primarily address the regressive impact of higher electricity rates through energy 
efficiency and distributed generation programs rather than direct rate assistance. While many 
states offer direct rate assistance to low-income ratepayers, none of the states studied increased 
or expanded their rate assistance to soften the costs of a CES. Instead, states have chosen cost 
softening programs that simultaneously reduce GHG emissions. California, New York, and 
Washington have all coupled energy efficiency targets with their CES. However, these targets 
are less precise for achieving equity outcomes than direct rate assistance. Energy efficiency 
improvements and distributed generation have high upfront costs that preclude low-income 
homeowners. Furthermore, a significant percentage of low-income ratepayers do not receive the 
long-term benefits of these programs because they do not own homes. As a result, whereas direct 
rate assistance is easy to prescribe progressively, energy efficiency improvements and distributed 
generation tend to be distributed regressively.  
Recognizing this issue, states have taken steps to ensure that low-income ratepayers have 
access to energy efficiency and distributed generation. California uses both ratepayer and 
polluter funded programs to provide no-cost energy efficiency improvements and rooftop solar to 
low-income households and renters. California’s $1 billion SOMAH program addresses the issue 
of homeownership by directing the benefits of multifamily rooftop solar to renters. Washington 
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has taken a different approach, instead building equity goals directly into its energy efficiency 
target. Whereas California and New York aim for a statewide reduction in energy use, 
Washington targets a reduction in the financial burden of energy bills. In this way, Washington 
directly ties equity goals to clean energy targets, while California and New York do so much 
more loosely. 
When their benefits are distributed equitably, energy efficiency and distributed 
generation can provide several advantages over direct rate assistance. Direct rate assistance can 
counteract clean energy goals by encouraging customers to use more electricity. Energy 
efficiency and distributed generation produce the opposite effect, advancing clean energy goals. 
Second, energy efficiency and distributed generation come with significant quality of life 
benefits. For example, California’s ESA program provides appliance upgrades to low-income 
consumers at no cost, and SOMAH provides crucial energy resilience for vulnerable populations. 
Third, energy efficiency and distributed generation create local jobs. While these jobs may not 
have the same union benefits as utility-scale construction, they can provide economic 
development in dense urban areas. Energy efficiency and distributed generation programs are 
clearly preferable to direct rate assistance, but they require aggressive policy intervention to 
achieve an equitable distribution of benefits.  
Workforce Transition: The Political Realities of the Just Transition  
 States attempt to ensure a just workforce transition through two main channels: the 
quality and allocation of new clean energy jobs and the protection of displaced fossil fuel 
workers. New Mexico’s emphasis on protections for fossil fuel workers reflects the political 
environment of a state economically dependent on fossil fuels. Through the securitization of its 
remaining coal plants, New Mexico provides severance and job training to displaced workers at 
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the expense of ratepayers. Washington and California instead focus on creating new 
opportunities in clean energy that outweigh those lost in fossil fuels. Specifically, they encourage 
project labor agreements to ensure that clean energy jobs are high paying, family wage jobs. 
Washington, California, and New Mexico all utilize apprenticeship programs to attract workers 
to the sector. New Mexico additionally makes apprenticeships available to displaced fossil fuel 
workers through scholarship funds. Overall, Washington and California prioritize the quality of 
new clean energy jobs, while New Mexico prioritizes making these jobs available to displaced 
workers. These differences reflect the reality of these states’ political environments. While New 
Mexico has been criticized for bailing out the fossil fuel industry, its CES provides a blueprint 
for meaningful climate policy in a moderate state with strong fossil fuel interests.  
 Labor provisions are a major source of conflict in the legislative process. These 
disagreements reveal the competing interests of labor unions, renewable energy developers, and 
environmental justice groups in CES policy. The results show the growing political power of 
renewable energy developers. New York’s CES almost contained the most comprehensive 
measures for labor equity, including both a safety net for fossil fuel workers and wage standards. 
But they were completely removed at the last minute to please developers. In Washington, 
developers won substantial tax cuts in exchange for good faith efforts to diversify hiring. They 
defeated efforts to put concrete requirements on workforce diversity, effectively weakening these 
provisions. In California, developers have counteracted environmental justice groups’ efforts to 
prioritize distributed generation. Even in New Mexico, developers won limited government 
oversight over replacement resources. There is potential for common ground amongst renewable 
energy developers and environmental justice groups, but so far CESs have revealed tensions 
more than they have brought these interests together.   
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Reparational Equity: Justice for Historical Inequity 
 The destructive history of the fossil fuel industry has forced clean energy policymakers to 
consider a broader definition of equity than that of traditional distributional equity. CESs are 
likely to impose significant costs on fossil fuel companies, yet New Mexico is the only state to 
directly address compensation for their stranded assets. New York, Washington, and California 
instead primarily direct compensation to the communities harmed by the fossil fuel industry. 
Whether or not fossil fuel corporations are deserving of compensation, this approach may leave 
behind vulnerable fossil fuel-dependent communities. States have not yet figured out how to 
protect fossil fuel workers and their communities without compensating a politically polarizing 
industry. 
The choice to protect historically disadvantaged communities rather than directly 
impacted communities markedly differs from traditional approaches to distributional equity. 
Even though these historically disadvantaged communities receive a high proportion of the 
benefits of CESs in the form of pollution reduction, states use policy interventions to further 
prioritize them for reinvestment and energy assistance. This phenomenon represents an approach 
to equity that seeks to address historical injustice rather than simply distribute costs and benefits 
proportionally. Environmental justice groups have led the push for this type of reparational 
equity with mixed success. California, Washington, and New York’s cumulative impact 
assessments incorporate historical inequity to varying degrees. Some of the factors considered, 
such as exposure to environmental harm or climate vulnerability, address inequities directly 
related to fossil fuel production, while others, such as socioeconomic status and public health, 
address more general inequities.  
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Race has emerged as a controversial issue within cumulative impact assessments and 
clean energy equity more generally. While race is already highly correlated with many 
indicators, New York and Washington directly address racial inequity through the explicit 
inclusion of racial demographics. Although California does not directly consider race, its 
disadvantaged communities are overwhelmingly dominated by racial minorities due to 
correlation with other indicators. New Mexico, on the other hand, does not prioritize Indigenous 
communities despite their close ties to the fossil fuel industry. New Mexico provides relief for 
displaced Indigenous workers, but it does not attempt to remediate the environmental destruction 
the fossil fuel industry has caused in Indigenous communities. Thus, New Mexico’s commitment 
to exclusively distributional equity leads to the neglect of Indigenous communities. This division 
between distributional equity and reparational equity has emerged as a principal policy 
consideration in CESs.  
Discussion 
CESs are remarkably straightforward in theory but incredibly difficult to implement 
given the diverse set of competing interests. CESs bring powerful stakeholders to the table, 
including labor unions, environmental organizations, local environmental justice groups, 
renewable energy developers, the fossil fuel industry, and Indigenous communities. In 
developing these landmark policies, the voices for equity have often been overshadowed by the 
interests of those with more political power. As a result, states have overwhelmingly preferred 
sweeping commitments to the concept of equity, rather than concrete and enforceable 
requirements. These ambitious but ambiguous goals may be reinterpreted or ignored in the future 
if they threaten to prevent the achievement of the CES. Especially as states get closer to full 
decarbonization, this tradeoff between clean energy and equity goals will intensify. For this 
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reason, successful equity provisions must be enforceable and irreversible. Instead, policymakers 
have loosely defined equity goals to appease environmental justice advocates while ensuring that 
clean energy targets and economic interests will not be compromised. 
Across the states studied there is no clear definition of equity among policymakers. While 
useful for describing the overall distribution of benefits, the simple definition of equity used in 
the economics literature misses the political reality. As seen in these four states, clean energy 
policy is deeply intertwined with the legacy of the fossil fuel industry. In order to reconcile this 
history, states need to address the interlocking systems of oppression that underlie the energy 
industry. Cumulative impact assessments represent the first step towards achieving this goal. 
However, their implementation has been thwarted by states’ unwillingness to prioritize equity on 
the same level as clean energy targets and economic interests.  While states have established 
comprehensive approaches to softening distributional impacts, the potential for broader social 
change has not yet been realized. The clean energy transition presents an opportunity to 
transform a national energy system steeped in institutional oppression into one based on equity. 
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